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THE POWER OF STOCKHOLDERS TO BIND A
CORPORATION.
MUNSON PRIZE THESIS.
In entering upon a discussion of the power of stockholders to
bind a corporation it is necessary at the outset to gain a definite
conception of what is embraced in the meaning of the term "to
bind," as it is hereafter to be used.
In the first place, in its more restricted sense the word, as
used in matters appertaining to the law, would seem to imply the
existence of a contract to which the parties are to be bound.
Were this the meaning which now is to be attached to it, the
matter in question would be restricted to the power of stockhold-
ers to make contracts enforceable against the corporation. It is
not intended to limit the subject in this way, but to take the
word in a broader sense so as to include not only a discussion of
the validity of the contracts above mentioned, but also the power
of stockholders to control the affairs of the corporation in other
ways, as by prescribing particular methods of carrying on the
corporate affairs, by committing the company to a specific course
of action, etc.
In the second place its members may by their actions bind the
corporation either directly or indirectly. It is a natural conse-
quence of the peculiar nature of this class of organizations that
for the actual performance of all that they do they are obliged to
resort to the employment of agents. These agents are subject to
the general rules governing that class of persons, and so far as
their acts are conformable to these rules they are valid and bind-
ing upon the corporation. They are appointed by the stockhold-
ers and their authority is derived from them, hence since the act
of the agent is the act of the principal, the stockholders in em-
ploying them may be considered as themselves acting indirectly
and as indirectly exerting through them the power to bind the
corporation. It is not the object of this paper to enter into a dis-
cussion of the power of the stockholders thus indirectly to bind
the corporation, as this is simply a matter of the application of the
principles of agency. But apart from this indirect method there
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exists in the stockholders the power directly to bind the corpora-
tion, even though in the execution of that power the intervention
of agents is indispensable, and it is this power independent of its
instruments that at present occupies our attention.
The consideration of the subject as thus presented naturally
divides itself into three heads which will be taken up in their order:
First, the power of the individual stockholder, and of stock-
holders acting individually.
Second, that of the majority.
Third, that of all the stockholders acting unanimously in a
corporate capacity. This last topic will be found to open up such
an extensive field that justice could be done to it only in a trea-
tise of much greater scope than this, and hence an attempt will be
made merely to apply to it briefly the principles which are dealt
with in the first two heads.
Bifore entering upon the discussion of this power as applied
to corporations it should be observed that great light is thrown
upon the subject by a constant reference to the principles -apply-
ing to partnership and other companies. In fact to a large
extent the rules that govern the partnership in this respect are
equally applicable to the corporation. And where there is a
diversity in them a comparison of the theories underlying the two
organizations will not only explain this, but it will also assist in
making clear what are the limitations upon the power in each
case. Hence, in each of the three aspects in which the subject is
discussed, the rules applicable to a partnership under the same
circumstances are reviewed.
I.-OF THE POWER OF THE INDIVIDUAL STOCKHOLDER, AND OF
THE STOCKHOLDERS ACTING INDIVIDUALLY.
Of the Individual.-It is a fundamental principle of the part-
nership that each member is in all matters within the apparent
and legitimate scope of the partnership business the general agent
of his co-partners, and the firm and all its members are liable for
whatever is done by him in transacting the business of the part-
nership in the ordinary way. The position of the stockholder of
a corporation is entirely different. He is neither the agent of the
corporation nor of its members, nor are his acts or contracts, as
an individual, binding on either, though made with reference to
the affairs of the corporation and for its benefit.
The reasons for this difference in the powers of the members
of a corporation and that of a partnership are to be found in a
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comparison of the natures of the two organizations. The partner-
ship can in no sense be viewed as having an existence apart from
that of its members. Its liabilities are their liabilities. They, in
short, are the partnership. The corporation on the other hand,
while it, like the partnership, is made up of individuals, is an
entity entirely distinct from the members that compose it. It is
a legal person, endowed with powers that belong in no wise to its
corporators, and which cannot be exercised by them. Its liabil-
ities are not the liabilities of its members, except to the limited
extent to which they have by their subscription assumed them.
It follows then that a stockholder, acting not in a corporate capac-
ity, should have no more power to control this separate and dis-
tinct individuality than should any other person. Nor does the
fact that his interests are bound up in that entity give him this
power, for by his contract of membership he has surrendered his
control, except in so far as by his vote he participates in corpo-
rate matters.
A second reason for the wider power of the partner as com-
pared with that of the stockholders is derived, not theoretically,
but from the practical working of the two associations. The part-
nership is made up of comparatively few persons, who have
united in a common enterprise with a full knowledge of one
another and with confidence and reliance each in the other. Not
so in the case of the corporation which from its origin contem-
plates a membership more or less numerous and composed of indi-
viduals whose very existence may be unknown to the others. It
stands to reason, therefore, that in his contract of membership
the stockholder has intended to confer upon his fellows no such
powers as does the partner on entering into the partnership.
Of Stockholders Acting ndividually.-The principle having
thus been established that the individual stockholders cannot bind
the corporation, it necessarily follows that any number of the
stockholders acting individually can have no greater power in
this respect. And when carried to its extreme it is a necessary
consequence of this rule that stockholders owning a majority or
even all the stock of the company cannot control the corporation,
except when acting duly in their capacity as members of the cor-
poration. This applies also with equal force to a single member
who himself represents a majority or even all the stock.
Illustrations.-In conformity with these rules it has been held
that a stockholder has no authority to release a debt due the cor-
poration. 1 That individual members cannot transfer the corpo-
1 Harris v. Mfg. Co., 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 267.
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rate property.2 Nor can they even although holding a majority
of all the stock, make a valid lease or sale of such property.3
Nor can they mortgage the same.4 Shareholders, when not act-
ing as a corporation, cannot convey lands of the corporation
though all join in the deed.5 The owner of all the capital stock
of a corporation does not become thereby the legal owner of its
property, and cannot maintain replevin for it in his own name.6
In the case of American Preserves Co. v. Norris (43 Fed. Rep.
714), the whole ground is covered in the following words: "It is
familiar law that a corporation has a personality of its own, dis-
tinct from that of its stockhqlders; that it is not affected in the
most remote degree by contracts made by its stockholders with
third parties, whether they own much or little of its capital stock,
and is not bound to discharge any personal obligation assumed by
its stockholders."
Having thus established the rules governing the first division
of our subject we are now ready to proceed to the second.
II.-OF THE POWER OF A MAJORITY.
Its Extent.-In considering the power of a majority it will be
found that it is similar in both corporations and partnerships. In
the charter on the one hand and in the partnership agreement on
the other are laid down in greater or less detail the general pur-
poses and ends of the organization. In becoming a member both
the stockholder and partner impliediy agree that in all that is nec-
essary or incidental to the attainment of these purposes the
majority shall have supreme authority and may bind the associa-
tion. The necessity of implying such an agreement is evident
when it is considered that if there were no such understanding it
would be possible for one dissenting member to prevent the trans-
action of any business whatsoever, however thoroughly it might
be included within the purposes of the association. The only
course then remaining to the company would be to secure the
concurrence of all the members in every matter concerning the
conduct of the company. As a consequence of this in the case of
a partnership the business of the firm would in all probability be
frequently brought to a complete standstill and its legitimate pur-
poses totally defeated. A fortiori would this be the case in the
2 Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U. S. 312.
3 Hopkins v,. Lead Co., 72 Ill. 379.
4 Engleman v. Dearborn, 141 Mass. 59o.
5 Wheelock v. Moulton, 15 Vt. 519.
6 Button ,. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20.
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corporation, a body composed in many instances of a great num-
ber of individuals, more or less scattered and inaccessible, and all
perhaps actuated by conflicting motives and interests. To
attempt to gain the unanimous consent of such a variety of con-
stituent elements would certainly be impracticable, and for busi-
ness purposes utterly impossible. Hence as the only alternative
we are led to conclude that the acts of a majority, in so far as they
are consistent with the charter are binding upon the corporation.
Its Linit.-From the fact that this power of the majority rests
wholly upon the original contract of the members, be it a charter
or a partnership agreement, it follows that in both classes of organ-
ization it must be limited in its extent by the scope of that same
contract. To adopt any other view would be to hold that the
dissentient stockholder would be compelled to resort to one of two
courses of action, both equally unjust. On the one hand he
could remain a member of the corporation and be bound by the
act of the majority, thereby being made a party to an obligation
which in entering into the corporation he had never contemplated
assuming, which he had never agreed expressly or impliedly to
assume, and which by his dissent he had even refused to assume.
That such a case is extremely unjust is palpable, and the other
alternative is equally oppressive. All that would remain for such
a stockholder would be to withdraw from the corporation. In
this way a majority could absolutely control the organization,
and the existence of such a power, susceptible to so great abuses
and so conducive to corruption, would open the way to the great-
est injustice. Hence, we derive the general principle that a
majority of the stockholders can bind the corporation in all matters
within the scope of the corporate purposes and in sucki matters only.
Illustrations.-As an illustration of this general principle may
be cited the leading case of Natusch v. Irving (2 Cooper's Chan.
358), in which Lord Eldon held that the majority of a corporation
organized fol the purpose of carrying on the business of fire insu-
rance could not authorize the company to deal in marine insu-
rance, and that the company would be enjoined from so acting at
the suit of any dissenting shareholder. In the case of Livingston
v. Lynch (4 Johns Ch. 573), an injunction was granted to restrain
a steamboat company from acting through an agent whose
authority, although derived from the majority, was inconsistent
with the charter agreement, and the Court said: "Where it is
declared in one of these (charter) resolutions, prescribing the
duties of the secretary, that he was to see that the resolutions of
a majority of the interest of the concer-m be carried into effect, it
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certainly could have referred only to resolutions passed in the
ordinary transactions of the concern, and in perfect subordination
to all and each of those articles of the original compact." And
in Pickering v. Stephenson (L. R. 14 Eq. 340), it is said: "* *
* * The special powers, given either to the directors or to a
majority, by the statutes or other constituent documents of the
association, however absolute in terms, are always to be con-
strued as subject to a paramount and inherent restriction that
they are to be exercised in subjection to the special purposes of
the original bond of association. This is not a mere canon of
English municipal law, but a, great and broad principle which
must be taken, in absence of proof to the contrary, as part of
any given system of jurisprudence."
In applying this general rule it will be found that the classes
of cases which come under its control are several, and it will be
necessary briefly to examine these in order.
By-Laws.-In the first place to facilitate the attainment of the
corporate purposes it is essential that a system of by-laws should
be adopted, regulating the government and business methods of
the company. In so far as they are reasonable and tend to effect
these purposes by-laws adopted by the majority are binding on
the corporation, and their right to make them rests on the
implied agreement of the shareholders in forming the company.
But any such rules, inconsistent with the original agreement
which is the fundamental rule of the company, or which are injuri-
ous to the interests of the concern, or are unreasonable or con-
trary to the general principles of the law, it is, in accordance
with our rule, beyond the power of the majority to thrust upon
the corporation. "7
Appointment of Agents.-As it is necessary that in its business
transactions the corporation should be represented by agents, it
is impliedly agreed in the charter contract that such agents should
be appointed. Hence, their appointment being within the limits
of the charter powers, it is also, in accordance with our rule,
impliedly agreed that the majority may select and confer author-
ity upon such .agents as may be necessary, and their choice in this
matter will bind the company.
Ratification.--Not only may the majority bind the corpora-
tion by its own acts within the limits laid down in the general
doctrine, but it may also exert the same power by way of a ratifi-
cation of unauthorized acts of its agents. Hence, it follows that
7 Bank v. Lanier, ii Wall. 369; Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.
Y. 182.
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an act of an agent outside of the scope of his authority may by
vote of the majority be made binding upon the corporation. But
it also follows that this power of ratification has the same limita-
tions as the primary power of the iajority and hence no act of
an agent which is beyond the limits of the charter can be made
effective.
Alteration of Charter.-To materially alter the terms of the
charter is clearly an act which is beyond the purpose of the
charter agreement, unless therein otherwise stipulated. Hence,
our rule would prevent the acceptance of such alteration by a
majority.8
Thus in a number of cases where railroad corporations have
been authorized to extend their lines further than was contem-
plated in the original agreement, it has been held that such an
amendment was a material alteration of the charter which could not
be accepted by the majority. This also covers all that class of cases
in which the consolidation of two or more corporations with the
legislative authority is attempted by the majority. In fact, the
majority cannot accept an amendment authorized by the legisla-
ture, even if by the same act the power so to do is placed in their
hands. For to hold that legislative enactment could confer such
power on any part of the stockholders would be to admit that the
Legislature could impair the obligation of the contract embod-
ied in the charter.
Transfer of all Corporate Property.-To sell out all the prop-
erty and privileges of a corporation is an act which is consistent
with the purposes of its charter, when it is made necessary by
the condition of the concern, as where the business has become.
unprofitable, and hence, it is within the powers of the majority
to bind the corporation by a sale under such circumstances. 9 But
a transfer effected by them while the affairs of the .concern are
prosperous, whether for a purpose beneficial to the stockholders
or not, is invalid,'0 and at the suit of a stockholder an injunction
will be granted to prevent such transfer, and if it has already
been completed it will be declared void and an accounting will
8 Stevens v. R. R., 29 Vt. 546; Hartford, etc., R. R. v. Crosswell. 5 Hill
385; New Orleans R. R. v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517; Pickering v. Stephenson,
L. R. r4 Eq. 322 Turnpike -Co. v. Phillips, 2 Penn. Rep. 184; Turnpike Co. V.
Locke, 8 Mass. 268; Turnpike Co. v. Swan, io Mass. 384; Union, etc., Co. v.
Towne. c N. H. 44.
9 Kean v. Johnson, 9 N. J. Eq. 4oi; Revere v. Copper Co., 15 Pick. 231.
10 Taylor v,. Earle, 8 Hun. i; Albert v. Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578; People
v. Ballard, 134 N. Y. 269; R. R. v,. Allerton, 85 U. S. 233; Kean v,. Johnson.
9 N. J. Eq. 4o.
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be decreed.'1 In the words of the Court in Kean v. Johnson (9
N. J. Eq. 4o8), "To sell the road, to abandon the contemplated
investment and embark in another scheme, whether entirely
different, or only more extensive than the original contemplation
as apparent on the face of the charter, is, as it seems to me,
clearly contrary to the rights of the individual stockholder. If
they had any rights as partners or beneficiaries it would seem to
be this, that their money should be devoted to that use, and
nevef employed in any other, nor returned to them before
they desire it. The mere statement of the proposition seemed
to me to prove it. No argument, however lengthened, can add
to the force of the naked position."
Majority Itself an Agent. -From a consideration of the differ-
ent varieties of cases, to which, as we have seen in this brief sum-
mary, the general doctrine applies, the fact becomes apparent
that the majority is itself in reality simply an agent of the cor-
poration-an agent deriving its authority from the implied agree-
ment of the charter contract of the members, and the scope of
whose powers is limited by the terms of that contract. This
view of the functions of a majority has been taken in many cases,
and seems to give a comparatively simple test of the extent of its
powers. Accordingly it would seem a necessary consequence of
the laws of agency that our rule must be qualified to a certain
extent and so extended as to admit that the majority may bind
the corporation in all matters within the apparent scope of its
authority. This qualification, however, will readily be seen to
be of no force as the charter determines the scope of that author-
ity, and persons dealing with the corporation must take notice of
the charter. Hence, its apparent powers can be no more than
those laid down in the charter, and the terms of the latter must
still be the deciding test.
As a further result of the .application of the laws of agency as
applied to the power of the majority, it follows that where the
latter has transcended its authority its acts may still be made
binding through ratification by the whole number of stockholders.
Restrictions on General Rule.-Although, as is seen from the
cases already reviewed, the doctrine as stated has been thoroughly
established, still in the greater number of corporations the powver
of the majority will be found to be actually much more strictly
confined, in most cases extending only to a general oversight of
the affairs of the company and to the appointment of its agents,
11 Ibid.
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while all other matters are delegated to the agents thus appointed.
This limitation, however, can be easily reconciled with the gen-
eral rule, for it will be found that, wherever such a restriction
exists, it is invariably provided for by the express terms of the
charter itself, which as we have seen must be in all cases the
ultimate criterion of the powers of the majority. The majority
then being but an agent itself can have no control over matters
in the province of the other agents nor can it bind the corporation
in matters placed by the charter in other hands. Bearing this in
mind, the many decisions which hold that corporations can do no
acts except through their directors, while apparently in direct
opposition to the rule in question, will be seen to be in reality per-
fectly compatible with it. For in each of those decisions it will
be found that the charter of the corporation in question contained
some express stipulation imposing this limitation upon the major-
ity. Such restrictions, therefore, instead of being, as they would
at first sight appear, exceptions to the rule, are, as a matter of
fact, simply the logical results of .its application.
Majority a Trustee.-There remains one further limitation
which arises under certain circumstances and which is not simply
apparent as was the last. It is to the effect that a sale of corpo-
rate property effected by a majority to itself cannot, unless made
in the utmost good faith, be valid as against a dissenting stock-
holder, however proper such sale might have been to any third
party. This restriction is entirely independent of the doctrine
expressed in our general rule and arises from the fact that the
relation between the majority and a stockholder is that of a trustee
to a cestui que trust, and the general principles applicable to that
relation must control in this case. This view of the position of
the majority is expressed by the Court in Erwin v. Oregon Ry.
& Nav. Co. (27 Fed. Rep. 631), in these words: "Where a num-
ber of stockholders combine to constitute themselves a majority
in order to control the corporation as they see fit, they become for
all practical purposes the corporation itself, and assume the trust
relation occupied by a corporation towards its stockholders. *
* * The corporation itself holds its property as a trust fund
for the stockholders, who have a joint interest in all its property
and effects, and the relation between it and its several members
is, for all practical purposes, that of trustee and cestui que trust."
III.-POWER OF STOCKHOLDERS ACTING UNANIMOUSLY.
Having thus disposed of the power of the individual stock-
holder and of the majority, there remains the final division of our
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subject-the power of the stockholders acting unanimously. An
act of all the members in their corporate capacity is an act of the
corporation itself. Hence this division of our subject embraces
simply the question as to the power of the corporation to bind
itself. It is no longer a matter of the power of the stockholders,
but involves the whole doctrine as to the so-called ultra vires acts.
A discussion of this theory is entirely beyond the scope of this
article. Suffice it to say that the rule applying to a majority does
not extend to the action of the whole membership. While no
mere majority however large may transcend the limits laid down
by the charter, it is otherwise with the stockholders acting unani-
mously, for many of their contracts and actions will be sustained
even though entirely without the scope of the charter purposes.
It is readily seen why such acts should be binding in so far as
they are not nullified by the intervention of other principles of
law. The charter was created and exists only by the unanimous
agreement of the stockholders. Hence it may be altered or
entirely repudiated by any subsequent unanimous agreement on
their part, and as among themselves they will be bound by any
action in pursuance of such an agreement, however alien it may
be to the terms of the original charter. But it is just at this
point that the general principles of the law and of public policy
intervene and determine which of these acts shall be deemed
valid and which of no effect. The rules governing this deter-
mination can be ascertained only from a study of the doctrine of
ultra vires powers.
It is no doubt true that for a complete discussion of the sub-
ject originally undertaken an examination into the doctrine of
ultra vires would be necessary. But so extensive is this doctrine,
and the results dependent upon it, that it should more fitly be
treated as a matter entirely independent of the subject in hand.
Hence, with the consideration of the first two divisions of our sub-
ject, as laid down at the outset, we may consider the discussion
concluded.
W. Lloyd Kitchel.
